This pAper expAnds on the analysis presented in a number of previous publications by the institute for security studies (iss) 1 on the drivers of conflict and instability in Africa. Apart from contextual analyses from a variety of sources, the paper relies on data from three large conflict data providers, namely the Uppsala Conflict data program (UCdp) at the Uppsala University in sweden, The first section presents global and African trends in armed conflict since 1960. it then moves on in the second section to place armed conflict within the broader context of political violence using more recent event data. Absolute fatality or event data at country level can, however, be quite misleading given the large disparities in population size between countries such as nigeria and somalia. The third section therefore presents an analysis of the fatality burden between key affected countries per 100 000 people to provide a comparable measure of the 'conflict burden' at national level. The paper then examines the high levels of non-state conflict in the Middle east and Africa compared to the rest of the world. This analysis introduces an examination of the systemic imbalances that drive instability in Africa. For reasons that relate to history, culture and geography, a broad distinction is made between sub-saharan Africa, 5 north Africa 6 and the Middle east. 
Graphic images of extreme violence have elevated the importance of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to levels above their actual size, strength and impact While armed conflict globally appears to be declining when compared to population size, other types of violence follow a different trend. Certainly, the rise of social media and the 24-hour news cycle create the impression of a world in turmoil. The everpresent camera, now on every smart phone, ensures the global circulation of graphic images of war and conflict. social media accentuate this view by conveying intense personal views, emotions and observations that are recycled globally. This trend is vitally important in the case of violent islamist extremism. Al-Qaeda and the islamic state, the two best known global brands, are dependent on relaying violence porn through mainstream media (e.g. television), social media (e.g. Twitter, youTube and Facebook) and the World Wide Web for their growth and reputation. videos and graphic images of brutal beheadings, torture and extreme violence have helped to elevated the relative importance of these movements to levels completely out of proportion to their actual size, strength and impact.
The move towards global multi-polarity is accentuating the sense of drift and turmoil. 12 in a world where war between countries is seldom officially declared and where the nature of organised violence has changed, the dividing line between armed conflict, organised crime and extremist political violence/terrorism has become blurred. While large scale armed conflict, with its associated high number of fatalities, is likely to continue its steady decline when reviewing trend lines over long-term horizons, the short-term implications of the increase in social instability, protests and terrorism are less clear.
Political violence vs fatalities
Whereas the UCdp gathers data on each incident where 25 or more battle-related deaths occur during a single year per dyad, i.e. between two specific conflicting parties, ACLed gathers more granular politically violent event data in Africa. According to ACLed, the nine countries that had the highest number of fatalities in 2014 were nigeria, south sudan, somalia, sudan, the CAr, Libya, egypt, Cameroon and the drC, in declining order of magnitude (see Figure 6a ). Collectively these countries contributed 92% of the total fatalities recorded by ACLed in that year. but they have vastly different population sizes, ranging from nigeria with an estimated population of 178 million to the CAr with a population of less than 5 million, which is a 38 times smaller population than nigeria's. As a result, the fatality burden differs markedly between them. even though somalia only has an estimated 11 million people, it had almost half the fatalities of those recorded for nigeria, which has 16 times more people than somalia. While Africa has very high levels of instability on a global level, the vast number of fatalities occur in quite a small number of countries
As reflected in Figure 6b , the fatality burden from political violence per 100 000 population is highest in four countries, namely the CAr, south sudan, Libya and somalia. Most remarkable is nigeria's shift from the most violent to the sixth most violent country. even more important is the only 8% of fatalities occurred in the remaining 42 countries for which ACLed gathers data in Africa. While Africa has very high levels of instability on a global level, the overwhelming number of fatalities occurs in quite a small number of countries. The UCdp defines non-state conflict as 'the use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year'. 18 The number of such events and the associated fatalities are consistently higher for Africa than for any other region globally. modelling is complex and beyond the scope of this paper, but the authors sought to build upon the substantial body of literature that had set out to understand the process of state formation. They saw the processes of security, capacity and inclusion as three broad but essentially sequential transformations in that process.
Non-state violence in Africa
Generally, a government's capacity to ensure law and order, police its territory effectively, monitor borders and suppress dissent is the most important determinant of stability, or the lack thereof. The majority of African governments do not fully control their territory, are unable to police their borders and, in extreme cases such as the drC or Mali, may be battling rebel groups that effectively control some of its provinces. in these circumstances external actors and events have a greater impact upon domestic stability than would otherwise be the case. Thus, relatively insignificant events such as the actions of a large multinational corporation pursuing commercial advantage, or a riot could have an impact vastly out of proportion to its original intention or scope.
The level of armed conflict in Africa is therefore quite sensitive to external developments, including global competition and fluctuations in commodity prices.
building on the analysis presented in previous iss papers on conflict trends and the dimensions of governance by hughes and others, two distinct types of systemic imbalance appear to explain the high levels of violence in the MenA and sub-saharan Africa regions. in the latter, instability is largely driven by the lack of capacity to govern, while the MenA region has particularly low levels of political and economic inclusion.
This is represented graphically in Figs 8 and 9, and briefly explained below.
Capacity is generally defined as the mobilisation and effective use of revenue.
Amongst others, hughes' study draws upon the tendency of modern states 'to mobilise and use a progressively higher share of gross domestic product as they develop economically and build professional public administrations'. 22 Leaving the exact formulation of the index aside, Figure 8 presents the governance capacity index for sub-saharan Africa compared to the Middle east, north Africa and the average for the world in 2011 (the year when the Arab spring started in Tunisia), using iFs. it is clear that the sub-saharan region has significantly less governance capacity than the Middle east and north Africa. in fact, it is significantly below the world average.
in Africa, governance capacity is highest in north Africa and southern Africa, not an unexpected finding given the relatively high levels of income of these regions compared to the rest of Africa. The lowest capacity is found in Central and West Africa, with east Africa and the larger horn region doing slightly better. The results from modelling the levels of inclusion is presented in Figure 9 , which indicates the extent to which the MenA region generally suffers from poor political and economic inclusion. This aspect is, in fact, significantly below the levels found in sub-saharan Africa and the world on average. At the same time, that region is extraordinarily richly endowed with natural resources, oil and gas, in particular, and is therefore a region with the potential to provide services and opportunities on a broad basis to its peoples.
While average income levels grew much more rapidly in the Middle east and in north Africa than in sub-saharan Africa, political inclusion changed only marginally until the events of the Arab spring changed the average score for north Africa, with
Tunisia showing the largest improvement. This change occurred at the same time as education-level improvements slowed down in sub-saharan Africa. The sum impact was a larger increase in relative deprivation (the political awareness of absolute deprivation) in north Africa and the Middle east compared to sub-saharan Africa.
north Africa therefore suffers from a large democratic deficit, and the Middle east even more so. both the conclusions are evident in Figure 9 .
Most African governments are of a mixed regime type (so-called anocracies), displaying both democratic and autocratic characteristics. Anocracies are inherently less stable than either autocracies (the most stable form of regime) or full multiparty democracies. The ongoing process of democratisation in Africa inevitably increases instability. An examination of democratisation trends (Figure 10 ) using data from the polity iv dataset 26 shows that levels of democracy in sub-saharan Africa were steadily deteriorating until the end of the Cold War. They then improved substantially during the between 1989 and 1994, only to be followed by slower rates of improvement thereafter. With the exception of countries such as swaziland, eritrea and equatorial Guinea, the levels of democracy in sub-saharan Africa are significantly higher than those in north Africa, having improved steadily over time.
improvements in the levels of democracy in north Africa only occurred as pressure from the Arab spring forced change in Tunisia, but led to disastrous consequences in adjoining Libya. 27 Average levels of democracy in the Middle east are even lower than in north Africa. The region only very recently graduated from full autocracy.
This incongruence between relatively high levels of human development on the one hand and very low levels of political voice and accountability, or inclusion, on the other go a long way towards explaining the rupture now known as the Arab spring, with all its unforeseen consequences. it also points to the inevitability of continued high levels of instability in the Middle east, despite the ability of countries such as saudi Arabia, the UAe, Kuwait and Qatar to buy off the demands for greater inclusion by offering non-political concessions based upon their oil income. in effect, the MenA region appears to be trapped. Generally, its regime types have an unstable mixture of autocratic and democratic characteristics and are all therefore categorised as anocracies in the polity classification system. in these circumstances relative deprivation is exceptionally high, and economic growth and rising expectations will inevitably have a huge impact on the prospects for stability as oil income declines. LeveLs oF deMoCrACy in sUb-sAhArAn AFriCA Are siGniFiCAnTLy hiGher ThAn in norTh AFriCA A shared history and religion is one part of this picture in which the capacity gaps within Arab Muslim societies in north Africa create a vacuum that is frequently filled by grassroots islamic organisations (such as the Muslim brotherhood). They step in to provide goods and services in health, education and housing. in the process, the strength of these islamic networks magnify the weakness of the state system and opens up the field for the rise of radical islam with its own political agendas. 28 This situation is not replicated elsewhere in the continent and the ethos of Muslim charity and help across boundaries appears to be much stronger in Arab Muslim societies than in regions that do not share this overarching influence.
Contextualising violent Islamist extremism
definitions of terrorism have always been contentious in Africa for two reasons. in a number of countries ranging from Algeria to south Africa, groups that were designated terrorist by a number of Western governments later became liberation movements and, shortly thereafter, governments. Another reason is that it is often difficult to draw a reasonable distinction between the actions of sub-state organisations such as the Lord resistance Army (Uganda/eastern drC), the Forces démocratiques de libération du rwanda (eastern drC), the Mai Mai (eastern drC), and balaika and séléka (the CAr), and 'accepted' terrorist organisations such as al-shabaab (somalia).
As a result, the coding/classification of terrorist incidents is fraught with political and practical challenges. even more problematic is labelling organisations (instead of acts) as inherently terrorist in terms of amelioration strategies. 29 For these reasons the organisation of African Unity (oAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), have adopted a complex definition of terrorism that notes that 'the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or selfdetermination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.' 30 The capacity gaps within Arab Muslim societies create a vacuum that is often filled by grassroots organisations The absence of opportunity and voice brings a political dimension to relative deprivation in the MenA region as the gap between political aspirations and the realities on the ground has grown. 'in most authoritarian Muslim countries, the mosque is the only institution not brutally suppressed by the regime. And when the mosque is the only outlet for mass politics, the outcome is predictable: the islamisation of dissent. As dissent turns islamic, what naturally follows is the politicisation of islam'.
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The result is the growth of radicalisation and, sometimes, of extremist violence.
in recent history, the key events that have driven the larger increases in violent islamist extremism globally can be set out in three broad cycles. The first cycle started with the 11 september 2001 attacks on the UsA (9/11) that lead to the war in Afghanistan shortly thereafter and eventually to a steady attrition of the ability of al-Qaeda to
MUsLiMs Are CAUGhT in The GroWinG Tension beTWeen reLiGioUs TrAdiTion And WesTern ModerniTy
When the mosque is the only outlet for mass politics, the outcome is predictable: the Islamisation of dissent perceptions of risk are highly correlated with levels of news coverage, but may be quite different from actual risk. 36 The current impression, considering the extent of news coverage, is that terrorism is a large contributor to instability and to fatalities in Africa, particularly in those countries with high levels of conflict.
Sizing the terrorism problem 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper builds on previous papers from the iss that reviewed the drivers, trends and characteristics of violence in Africa.
Using data from three sources, namely the UCdp, ACLed and the GTd, this paper presents a story of a rapid increase in armed conflict and violence in the decade preceding the collapse of the berlin Wall, and an even more rapid decline thereafter to levels approximating those several decades earlier. previous work has already pointed to the fact that Africa and the Middle east are the two regions that have the highest conflict burden in the world when fatalities are measured in proportion to population size. beyond their high levels of armed violence, the two regions share a second characteristic in that both have particularly high levels of non-state violence, i.e.
conflict that does not involve government. 
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The Armed Conflict Location and event data project (ACLed) collects and codes event data on conflict and political events on a two-weekly basis, and includes political violence and protests by governments, rebels, militias, communal groups, political parties, rioters, protestors and civilians. The ACLed datasets used in this paper are ACLed version 5 (1997-2014) standard, and 2015 real-time data updated to 3 september 2015.
4
The Global Terrorism database (GTd) is maintained by the national Consortium for the study of Terrorism and responses to Terrorism (sTArT). see www.start.umd.edu/gtd. The GTd dataset used in this paper is the GTd 1970-2014 data file.
5
sub-sahara Africa includes all African countries except those countries listed as part of north Africa.
6
north Africa consists of Algeria, egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
7
The Middle east consists of bahrain, iran, iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, oman, Qatar, saudi Arabia, syria, UAe and yemen. . however, these numbers need to be placed in relationship to the size of the respective populations: Mexico at that time had a larger population than all three other countries combined.
12 see, for example, Chester Crocker, The strategic dilemma of a world adrift, in Survival, international institute for strategic studies, London 57(1), February-March 2015: 7-30.
13
The number was 52 755 in 1998. 14 The increase in the number of reported conflict events does not necessarily indicate an increase in violence, since different media outlets may report the same event. Furthermore, since ACLed uses many different media sources, it is possible for a story to be picked up more than once (if a particular source publishes an article that originated from a different source), even though extensive data cleaning is done.
15 Although Asia has the highest number of armed conflicts in absolute terms, given its large population. 
